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How does incomplete risk-sharing aﬀect the level and volatility of macroeconomic
activity? We investigate this question by introducing a Ramsey growth model
with incomplete markets, decentralized production, and idiosyncratic technolog-
ical risk. The combination of uninsurable shocks with the precautionary motive
can slow down capital accumulation or give rise to persistent ﬂuctuations, even
when agents are very patient, technology is strictly convex, and the wealth distri-
bution has no eﬀect on endogenous aggregates.
We consider a GEI1 growth economy with heterogeneous agents, who are both
consumers and producers. Agents can invest in a private neoclassical technology
with diminishing returns to scale. In contrast with the traditional Ramsey model,
agents are exposed to idiosyncratic shocks in their productive investment, and
possibly in some exogenous income. Agents can also trade in ﬁnancial markets.
They can borrow or lend a risk-free bond, and partially hedge their idiosyncratic
risks by exchanging a ﬁnite number of risky assets. All securities are real and
there are no constraints on short sales. A representative agent generally does not
exist in our economy, but explicit aggregation is possible in the CARA-normal
case. When markets are complete, the model reduces to the Ramsey growth
model with identical agents, as in Cass (1965), Koopmans (1965), and Brock and
Mirman (1972). On the other hand, with missing markets, ineﬃciencies arise
because individual producers must bear idiosyncratic risks that cancel out at
the aggregate level. This can lead to suboptimal investment, poverty traps, and
endogenous ﬂuctuations.
Under a ﬁnite horizon, the shocks received at the terminal date cannot be
smoothed through time by borrowing and lending. Agents thus have a strong
precautionary motive and accumulate large aggregate wealth in later periods. The
anticipation of these movements generate ﬂuctuations along the entire equilibrium
path in some economies.
Rich dynamics also exist under an inﬁnite horizon. For instance, multiple
steady states can arise from the endogeneity of the interest rate. In a rich equi-
librium, a low interest rate supports a high investment in the risky technology
and a low level of marginal productivity. Conversely in a poor steady state or
poverty trap, a high interest rate motivates agents to choose small amounts of
the risky investment. Because the interest is endogenous, agents may thus prefer
1GEI is the standard acronym for General Equilibrium with Incomplete markets.
2to remain poor in equilibrium rather than bear the large investment risks that
are required to increase their standards of living. Poverty traps thus originate
from the endogeneity of the interest rate in the capital markets, a source of mul-
tiplicity that, to the best of our knowledge, is new to the literature. In contrast,
earlier work has obtained poverty traps from wealth eﬀects, building on the idea
that poorer agents take less risks and can thus be trapped at low wealth levels
(e.g., Banerjee and Newman, 1991). Our model assumes CARA preferences and
therefore eliminates the inﬂuence of wealth on risky investment. The paper thus
highlights that, in addition to the wealth eﬀect, there is another channel through
which ﬁnancial incompleteness may aﬀect the development of an economy: the
impact of the interest-rate on risk taking.
The introduction of a new asset has an ambiguous eﬀect on aggregate wealth
in a steady state. On one hand, the new asset reduces technological risk, thus
encouraging investment. On the other hand, ﬁnancial innovation decreases the
precautionary demand for savings, thereby increasing the interest rate and dis-
couraging productive investment. In calibrated examples, the level of aggregate
wealth is found to be the highest in economies with intermediate or high levels of
ﬁnancial sophistication.2 The eﬀect of ﬁnancial innovation on the interest rate is
similarly nonmonotonic in some economies.
The local dynamics around the steady state have a rich structure under incom-
plete markets. Depending on the economy’s parameters, a steady state is locally
unique, totally unstable or locally undetermined, and the equilibrium path can
be attracted to a limit cycle. The complicated dynamics arise even when agents
are very patient, suggesting that ﬁnancial incompleteness is a useful substitute
to technological nonconvexities in models of endogenous business cycles (Boldrin
and Montrucchio, 1986; Benhabib and Farmer, 1994; Mitra, 1996).
Calibrated examples show that ﬁnancial incompleteness has a substantial im-
pact on the speed of convergence to the steady state. In the complete market
framework, the transitional dynamics are determined by the agents’ willingness
2The literature has often suggested that ﬁnancial innovation reduces the precautionary mo-
tive and may therefore be detrimental to growth (Mauro, 1995; Devereux and Smith, 1994).
This type of argument ignores the adverse eﬀect of production risk on the accumulation of
physical or human capital. The present paper analyzes the trade-oﬀ between the two eﬀects in a
Ramsey framework with diminishing returns to capital accumulation, while a companion article
(Angeletos and Calvet, 2000) and other pertinent work (e.g., Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990;
Obstfeld, 1994; Devereux and Smith, 1994) address these issues in the context of endogenous
growth.
3to smooth consumption across time. Financial incompleteness can slow down
convergence through another eﬀect: the sensitivity of interest rates to the precau-
tionary motive. In an initially poor economy, agents make small risky investments
and thus have a weaker precautionary motive than in the long run. The low de-
mand for savings puts an upward pressure on the interest rate, which accentuates
the low level of capital investment and slows down convergence. Conversely in
a rich economy, high investment in the risky technology implies a strong precau-
tionary motive and a low interest rate, thus intensifying the high level of capital.
In both cases, prudence increases the persistence of aggregate shocks and has an
ampliﬁcation eﬀect on productive investment.
This research emphasizes that technological and endowment risks have very
distinct eﬀects on aggregate economic activity. In general equilibrium, individual
income risks are not entirely exogenous to the economy, but reﬂect the uncertainty
associated with endogenous production and investment activities. This point was
not considered by Krusell and Smith (1998) in their inﬂuential work on the role of
incomplete markets in the neoclassical growth model. In contrast to their results,
we show the presence of undiversiﬁable technological risks can have profound
eﬀects on aggregate investment, wealth, and volatility.
Our model has interesting policy implications. Completing ﬁnancial markets
may not only help improve welfare and reduce social inequalities through bet-
ter risk-sharing; it may also stimulate investment and dampen the large ﬁnancial
volatility reported by Shiller (1981, 1989) and others. From an empirical perspec-
tive, ﬁnancial incompleteness also has an ampliﬁcation eﬀect on the propagation
of aggregate shocks. Small and serially independent shocks on the fundamentals
of the economy may generate large and persistent ﬂuctuations in the aggregates.3
Section 2 introduces the GEI Ramsey economy. We solve the individual deci-
sion problem and calculate the equilibrium path under a ﬁnite horizon in Section 3.
In Section 4 we introduce the inﬁnite-horizon economy and examine the compar-
ative statics and local dynamics of the steady state. In Section 5 we calibrate the
model around the steady state and analyze the persistence of aggregate shocks.
We conclude in Section 6. Unless stated otherwise, all proofs are given in the
3The calibration of standard real business cycle (RBC) models requires large and persistent
exogenous aggregate shocks to match the observed data (e.g., Kydland and Prescott, 1982;
Prescott, 1986). In light of our ﬁndings (especially Section 5), introducing ﬁnancial incomplete-
ness in the standard RBC framework may help reduce the magnitude and persistence of the
exogenous shocks required to match the same data.
4Appendix.
Literature Review
The paper brings together several branches of the literature. First, it adds ﬁ-
nancial incompleteness to the Ramsey growth model developed by Cass (1965),
Koopmans (1965) and Brock and Mirman (1972). When the technology has de-
creasing returns to scale, the one-sector model is known to exhibit a unique saddle
path in which future wealth is an increasing function of current wealth. This pre-
cludes nonmonotonicities or endogenous ﬂuctuations along the equilibrium path.
For this reason, researchers have considered the optimal growth problem with non-
convexities in production, and shown that complicated dynamics or endogenous
cycles can arise (Boldrin and Montrucchio, 1986; Deneckere and Pelikan, 1986;
Sorger, 1992). These ﬂuctuations, however, only appear when agents are very im-
patient.4 For instance, Mitra (1996) proves that a period-three cycle only exists if
the psychological discount factor β is less than the constant [(
√
5−1)/2]2 ≈ 0.38.
By contrast, our GEI growth economy generates deterministic ﬂuctuations with a
Cobb-Douglas technology for large values of the discount factor, such as β =0 .99.
The macro ﬂuctuations exhibited in this paper are also reminiscent of the
perfect foresight equilibria observed in deterministic economies with overlapping
generations (Benhabib and Day, 1982; Grandmont, 1985) or credit market imper-
fections (Galor and Zeira, 1993; Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997; Aghion, Bacchetta
and Banerjee, 1998; Aghion, Banerjee and Piketty, 1999). We contribute to this
literature by showing that market incompleteness is an alternative source of ﬂuc-
tuations in aggregate output. This paper thus extends the results obtained in the
incomplete-markets exchange economy of Calvet (1997). While in that model ag-
gregate wealth is ﬁxed by construction, the present paper shows that the combina-
tion of precautionary savings and ﬁnancial incompleteness can lead to endogenous
cycles in the real sector of the economy.
There is an extensive literature on decision theory under incomplete markets
a n da ni n ﬁnite horizon, which originates in the contributions of Bewley (1977),
Yaari (1976), Schechtman (1976), and Schechtman and Escudero (1977). Under
very general conditions, Chamberlain and Wilson (2000) show that when the ex-
ogenous interest rate is at least as large as the rate of time preference and the
individual faces idiosyncratic income risks, her assets will eventually diverge to
4Note that it is possible to observe ﬂuctuations in a multi-sector growth model for more
patient agents (Benhabib and Nishimura, 1979).
5inﬁnity due to the precautionary motive. In the limit, the individual accumulates
an inﬁnite buﬀer stock and can perfectly insulate her consumption from income
shocks. These results, however, cannot be true in general equilibrium. In our
model, like in Aiyagari (1994) and Krusell and Smith (1998), the interest rate is
endogenous and converges to a level suﬃciently low to support a ﬁnite accumula-
tion of assets in the steady state. As a result, agents cannot fully self-insure along
the equilibrium path.
The recent numerical literature has explored the robustness of the Ramsey
model with respect to agent heterogeneity and idiosyncratic uncertainty.5 Aiya-
gari (1994) considers the eﬀect of exogenous endowment shocks on the steady
state in the absence of aggregate and idiosyncratic technological risk.6 Krusell
and Smith (1998) extend Aiyagari’s framework to the case of aggregate produc-
tivity shocks, but retain the assumption of no undiversiﬁable idiosyncratic tech-
nological risks. In their model, the behavior of the macroeconomic aggregates is
almost perfectly described by the ﬁrst moment of the wealth distribution, and the
transitional dynamics are strikingly similar to those of the single-agent Ramsey
economy.
Our model diﬀers from these approaches in several respects. First, in earlier
work, the aggregate capital stock and possibly a risk-free bond are the only avail-
able assets and cannot be sold short. By contrast, we assume that agents can
trade a riskless asset and an arbitrary number of risky securities. There are no
short-sales constraints, which allows us to disentangle the impact of borrowing
constraints from missing assets or insurance markets. Second, and more impor-
tantly, we extend earlier papers by considering the eﬀect of idiosyncratic techno-
logical risk. The introduction of idiosyncratic rather than aggregate investment
risk generates critical market ineﬃciencies. The distinction between production
and endowment risk drives the comparative statics of the steady state, helps us
characterize the types of ﬁnancial innovation that encourage or dampen economic
growth, and generates novel implications for the propagation of aggregate shocks.
Third, our model generates closed-form expressions for the aggregate dynamics.
5See Ljungqvist and Sargent (2000) for an excellent discussion of these developments.
6In related work, Scheinkman and Weiss (1986) consider an incomplete market economy
with endogenous labor supply but no capital accumulation. Because agents have a disutility
for labor, the poor are more willing to work than the rich, and aggregate production is higher
when the more productive agents have little wealth. Fluctuations in our model have a profoundly
diﬀerent origin, and arise even though macro variables are always independent of the distribution
of wealth.
6We can therefore analyze equilibrium multiplicity and the local dynamics around
a steady state. Unlike earlier models, we can also calculate the growth paths when
the economy has a ﬁnite horizon. Finally, our model generates rich dynamics in
ﬁnancial prices, capital investment and aggregate output.
2. A Ramsey Model with Incomplete Markets
This section introduces the one-sector growth model with incomplete markets. We
successively specify technologies, preferences, asset markets and the equilibrium
concept.
2.1. Agents and Idiosyncratic Risks
We consider a dynamic economy in discrete time with a ﬁnite or an inﬁnite horizon
T. The economy is stochastic and all random variables are deﬁned on a probability
space (Ω,F,P). Individuals h =1 ,...,H are born at date t =0 , and live and
consume a single consumption good in dates t =0 ,..,T.
Each individual is an entrepreneur who owns his own stock of capital and
operates his own production scheme.7 The technology is standard neoclassical,
convex, and requires neither adjustment costs nor indivisibilities in investment.
These assumptions would lead to the standard neoclassical growth model, if it
were not for the following: production is subject to (partially undiversiﬁable)
idiosyncratic uncertainty. An investment of kh




t units of the consumption good at date t+1. The constant
δ ∈ [0,1] denotes the depreciation rate of capital. The production function F is
increasing, strictly concave, and satisﬁes the Inada conditions.8 The total factor
productivity Bh
t+1 is a multiplicative random shock speciﬁc to individual h, called
technological or investment risk. It is the key ingredient of the model.
We also ﬁnd it useful to introduce two other sources of income. First, pro-
ducers have access to a storage technology with gross rate of return ρ ∈ [0,1].
An investment of sh
t units of the good in the storage technology yields ρsh
t with
7The diﬃculties associated to multiple ownership under incomplete markets are well known
(Grossman and Hart, 1979).
8We neglect the labor-leisure choice, and implicitly assume a concave technology b F(K,L)
with constant returns to scale. We normalize labor to L =1 , denote by k = K/L the capital
intensity, and consider the reduced production function F(k) ≡ b F(k,1). The function F satisﬁes
the conditions F0 > 0,F 00 < 0,F (0) = 0,F 0(0) = +∞,F(+∞)=+ ∞, and F0(+∞)=0 .
7certainty at date t +1 . Second, entrepreneurs receive a stochastic endowment
stream {eh
t}T
t=0. The additive shock eh
t models risks that are outside the control
of individuals and do not aﬀect production capabilities. The additive endowment
risk eh
t+1 and the multiplicative shock Bh
t+1 are both idiosyncratic,b u to n l yt h e
latter aﬀects the return on investment.
The idiosyncratic shocks Bh
t+1 allow us to capture the impact on growth of a
wide range of technological risks. The uncertainty of an entrepreneurial project
obviously inﬂuences speciﬁc investment in capital or R&D. Similarly, the riskiness
of a worker’s human capital, or of the matching between his skills and the ﬁrm,
aﬀects important decisions such as the supply of labor,9 education, learning by
doing, job search, career choices, etc. In this sense, the model helps analyze how
a large class of idiosyncratic risks inﬂuences the accumulation of physical, human
or intangible capital. Our approach thus contrasts with the usual simplifying
hypothesis that income shocks have a purely exogenous origin (Aiyagari, 1994;
Krusell and Smith, 1998). While the exogeneity assumption may be reasonable
in a life-cycle framework, general equilibrium modelling should recognize that
labor income is substantially determined by idiosyncratic production shocks. Our
analysis will show that the distinction between endowment risk and investment
risk is critical, and should prompt the reassessment of some arguments appearing
in the literature.
2.2. CARA-Normal Speciﬁcation
T h em o d e li st r a c t a b l ei nt h eC A R A - n o r m a lc a s e .T h ei d i o s y n c r a t i cs h o c k sBh
t+1
and eh
t+1 are Ft+1—measurable, unknown at t and revealed at t +1 .T h e ya r ea s -
sumed to be jointly normal. We complement this distributional assumption by the
speciﬁcation of preferences. Consider a ﬁxed A>0, and u(c) ≡−exp(−Ac)/A.
From a consumption stream {ch
t}T


















Since individual consumption is stochastic, at each period t agents maximize their
expected utility conditional on available information.
9See Marcet, Obiols-Homs and Weil (2000) for a recent discussion of the labor supply in the
neoclassical growth context.
8The CARA-normal speciﬁcation implies that aggregate demand and equilib-
rium macro variables are independent from the distribution of wealth. This allows
us to achieve explicit aggregation and derive new channels through which ﬁnan-
cial incompleteness aﬀects economic activity. Our approach thus complements
the vast literature on CRRA preferences, where the distribution of wealth, an
inﬁnite-dimensional object, enters the state space of the economy. Wealth eﬀects
then typically prevent the existence of analytical solutions and approximate nu-
merical simulations are the only way to proceed. The CARA-normal speciﬁcation
permits us to overcome this analytical obstacle, but does not seem to invalidate
our result that incomplete markets can generate complicated dynamics. With
CRRA preferences or borrowing constraints, the wealth distribution would be an
additional channel through which idiosyncratic uncertainty aﬀects aggregate be-
havior, as has been emphasized in the literature (Galor and Zeira, 1993; Aiyagari,
1994). Perhaps surprisingly, we show that rich dynamics can arise even in the
absence of such eﬀects.
2.3. The Asset Structure
Individual risks can be partially hedged by trading a limited set of short-lived
securities i =0 ,..,N.E a c ha s s e ti is worth πi,t units of the good at date t, and
yields a random amount of consumption di,t+1 at date t +1 . Security i =0is
riskless, in the sense that d0,t+1 ≡ 1 with certainty in date t +1 . The quantity
Rt ≡ 1/π0,t then denotes the gross interest rate between t and t+1, and rt = Rt−1
is the corresponding net rate. Assets are in zero net supply,10 there are no short
sales constraints, and default is not allowed.11 It is convenient to stack asset prices
and payoﬀsi nt h ev e c t o r sπt =( πi,t)N
i=0 and dt+1 =( di,t+1)N
i=0. Without loss of
generality, we assume that (di,t+1)N
i=0 is an orthonormal family of L2(Ω), implying
that risky assets have zero expected payoﬀs and are mutually uncorrelated. At
the outset of every period t, investors are informed of the realization of the asset
payoﬀs dt and idiosyncratic shocks {(Bh
t ,e h
t)}H
h=1.12 Information is thus symmetric
10A positive asset supply could be introduced by considering a government issuing public debt,
or by opening the economy to international asset markets. We do not expect these alternatives
to alter the signiﬁcance of our results.
11Default or short-sales constraints would introduce kinks and nonconvexities that would
presumably strengthen the failure of the complete-markets framework.
12The results of this paper would not be modifed under the weaker assumptions that income
shocks are privately observed and that the structure of the economy is common knowledge. We
9across agents and generates a ﬁltration {Ft}T
t=0. Conditional on the information





i=0 at date t.
We assume by construction that all the assets traded in one period are short-
lived, in the sense that they only deliver payoﬀs in the next period. In the next
sections, we will show that there is no risk premium in equilibrium, and that
t h ei n t e r e s tr a t es e q u e n c e{Rt}0≤t<T is deterministic and known in advance to all
agents. For this reason, equilibrium allocations and prices do not change if we
introduce a long-lived security delivering one unit of the good every period. Such
a security, called a perpetuity, is worth πL(t)=
PT−1
s=t 1/(Rt...Rs) at date t after
delivery of the period’s coupon.13
Asset returns and the idiosyncratic risks of all agents are assumed to be jointly
normal. For simplicity, we also consider that the vectors {dt+1,(Bh
t+1,eh
t+1)1≤h≤H}
are i.i.d. across time, and that the idiosyncratic shocks (Bh
t+1,e h
t+1) are identically
distributed across agents.14 For all h,t, we can project the idiosyncratic risks Bh
t+1
and eh
t+1 on the asset span available at date t:
B
h




























t+1 represent the undiversiﬁable component of the investment
and endowment shocks to individual h. They are assumed to be identically dis-
use a stronger assumption in the text to emphasize that the endogenous ﬂuctuations observed
in equilibrium do not originate from information assymmetries.
13More generally, traders can dynamically replicate a large class of long-lived risky assets.
14This assumption simpliﬁes notation and permits us to focus on the leading case of a fully
stationary economy. As in the deterministic Ramsey model (see for instance Barro and Sala-i-
Martin, 1995), decision-theoretic and equilibrium calculations easily extend to economies with
an exogenous growth rate g ≥ 0. Given a stationary random process (Bh
t ,e h
t ,d t),c o n s i d e r
production returns, endowments, and asset returns of the form b Bh
t =( 1 + g)t Bh
t , b eh
t =( 1 + g)t eh
t ,
and b dt =( 1+g)t dt. We also assume that the CARA coeﬃcient decays at rate g; the utility in
period t is thus ut(c)=−exp(− b Atc)/ b At, where b At = A(1 + g)−t. Under these assumptions,
the equilibrium equations derived in Sections 3 and 4 directly apply to the detrended values of
consumption and investment.
10tributed across investors, and the corresponding variances
σ
2


































t =0for all t. Because there is no
risk premium in equilibrium, risky assets will play only one role in the model −
the deﬁnition of the uninsurable risks ηh
t and εh
t. Economies without risky assets
are therefore important special cases of our model, which naturally arise when
states, and thus individual shocks, are not publicly observed.15
2.4. GEI Equilibrium
For any quotation {πt}T








t=0 adapted to the ﬁltration {Ft}T
t=0. Under an inﬁnite horizon
(T = ∞), the possibility of Ponzi games must be addressed. In our model, it is
suﬃcient to impose
Assumption 1. When the time horizon is inﬁnite, an admissible consumption
plan satisﬁes β
tE0 exp(−Awh
t ) → 0 as t →∞ .












t )+( 1− δ)kh
t + ρsh




with the convention that sh
T =0and θ
h
T =0when T is ﬁnite. The variable wh
t ,
called wealth,t h u sr e p r e s e n t st h et r a d e r ’ sn e tc r e d i to rd e b tp o s i t i o na td a t et and
is independent of the income expected in later periods.
Deﬁnition 1. A GEI equilibrium consists of a price sequence {πt}T
t=0 and a








15By construction, a trader does not extract relevant information from observing the shocks
of other agents. When only the riskless asset is traded, the same equilibrium path thus arises
whether endowments are privately or publicly observed.
11(i) Each agent’s plan is optimal.





In the next sections, we show that the equilibrium calculation is straightforward
within this framework.
3. Equilibrium under a Finite Horizon
We derive in this section the equilibrium equations of our Ramsey economy when
the time horizon is ﬁnite.
3.1. Decision Theory
Consider a ﬁxed entrepreneur h facing an exogenous, deterministic path of asset
prices {πt}T
t=0.W e d e n o t e J(w,t) as the indirect utility of wealth along the ex-
ogenous price path, and Jw(w,t) as the marginal utility. At date t,t h ei n v e s t o r
maximizes u(ch
t)+βEtJ(wh
t+1,t+1)subject to the budget constraints (2.3). This
problem has a closed form solution under
Recursive Condition. The marginal utility of wealth satisﬁes
Jw(w,t +1 )=e x p [ −A(at+1w + bt+1)]
in period t +1 ,w h e r eat+1 > 0 and bt+1 are two constant numbers.
There exists an arbitrage opportunity if Rt < ρ : the agent wants to borrow an
inﬁnite amount at rate Rt and invest it in the storage technology. The existence
of an optimal decision thus requires that Rt ≥ ρ. T h ei n v e s t o rd o e sn o tu s et h e
storage technology if Rt > ρ, and is indiﬀerent between the bond and storage
when Rt = ρ. In the latter case, only the sum θ
h
0,t + ρsh
t is determined by the
decision problem.
Let Φ(k) ≡ BF(k)+(1−δ)k+e denote the expected revenue next period when
investing k units of capital. Because investors are facing idiosyncratic uncertainty,
we also consider the “risk-adjusted” production function














12W ec a nt h e np r o v e
Theorem 1. When B+Rt
PN
i=1 πi,tκh













i = Rt. (3.1)
The agent does not use the storage technology if Rt > ρ, and chooses a portfolio
of the bond and the storage technology if Rt = ρ. The individual consumption-























where the quantities at and bh




















The utility of wealth at t satisﬁes Jw(w,t)=e x p [ −A(at+1w+bt+1)] and is therefore
of the CARA-type.
Because the agent has a precautionary motive, the function G,t h ei n t e r c e p tbh
t and
the consumption level ch
t decrease with the variances σ2
E and σ2
P of the uninsurable
shocks.
In the absence of a risk premium, the price of risky assets is zero: πi,t =0
(i =1 ,..,N), as will be the case in equilibrium.16 The optimal capital stock then
satisﬁes the reduced condition
Gk(k
h
t ,a t+1)=Rt. (3.4)
16The equilibrium risk premium would not be zero if there were aggregate uncertainty, in
which case equilibrium consumption would be correlated with asset returns.
13Although the production function F(k) is strictly concave, the risk-adjusted func-
tion G(k,a)=Φ(k) − Aa[F(k)2σ2
P + σ2
E]/2 need not be concave when σP > 0.
The function Gk(k,a) can thus be non-monotonic in k, and the optimality condi-
tion (3.4) can have multiple solutions. The optimal capital stock is easily selected
among the solution set under
Assumption 2. The technology satisﬁes at least one of the following conditions:
(i) ρ ≥ 1 − δ
(ii) F(k)=kα, 0 < α < 1
(iii) The function [F(k)]2 is convex.
W ec a nt h e np r o v e
Proposition 1. Under Assumption 2, the optimal capital stock is the smallest
solution to equation (3.4): kh
t =m i n {k : Gk(k,at+1)=Rt}.17
We now turn to the equilibrium calculation.
3.2. Equilibrium Analysis
Let Ct,W t,K t, and St denote the population average of consumption, wealth,




is an exogenous parameter of the economy, which is conveniently denoted by W 0.
For simplicity, we focus on deterministic equilibria, in which the terminal wealth
WT is known with certainty at date t =0 . We can then prove
Theorem 2. T h em a c r o e c o n o m i cv a r i a b l e sCt,W t,K t,S t and Rt are determin-
istic along an equilibrium path. All agents have identical marginal propensities to
consume at and choose identical levels of risky investment: kh
t = Kt for all h.
The risk premium is equal to zero. When B>0, an equilibrium path satisﬁes in
17In general, the optimal capital stock need not be the ﬁrst solution to (3.4), and switches
between solutions are a potential source of rich dynamics. We ﬁnd it more striking to exhibit
ﬂuctuations in the absence of such eﬀects.
14every t ≤ T − 1 the relations:
Rt = Gk(Kt,a t+1) ≡ F0(Kt)[B − Aat+1F(Kt)σ2
P]+1− δ, (3.5)
Wt+1 = Φ(Kt)+ρSt ≡ BF(Kt)+( 1− δ)Kt + e + ρSt, (3.6)
at =1 /[1 + (at+1Rt)−1], (3.7)






Wt = Ct + Kt + St, (3.9)
and the boundary conditions W0 = W 0,a T =1 ,K T =0 .18
The equilibrium equations contain rich economic eﬀects. When the technological
risk cannot be fully hedged (σP > 0), the interest rate is equal to the risk-
adjusted marginal return F0(Kt)[B − Aat+1F(Kt)σ2
P]+1− δ. Under incomplete
markets, risk aversion thus creates an interaction between the current investment
Kt and the future marginal propensity at+1. We also note that the consumption





E]. This is a well-known consequence of the precautionary
motive (Leland, 1968; Sandmo, 1970; Caballero, 1990).
Equilibrium paths can be calculated by a backward recursion. Consider the
macroeconomic vector xt =( at,C t,W t,K t,S t,R t), and the reduced state vector
zt =( at,C t,W t). We easily show
Proposition 2. For any state vector zt+1 =( at+1,C t+1,W t+1) ∈ (0,1] × R ×
[e,+∞), there exists a unique macroeconomic vector xt =( at,C t,W t,K t,S t,R t)
∈ (0,1) × R2 × R3
+ satisfying recursive relations (3.5) − (3.9).
Proof. Let K∗
t denote the smallest solution to the equation GK(K,at+1)=ρ,
and let W ∗
t+1 = Φ(K∗
t ). Any solution xt can be calculated by following procedure.
Step 1. If Wt+1 <W ∗
t+1, equations (3.5) and (3.6) imply that Kt = Φ−1(Wt+1),
St =0 , and Rt = Gk(Kt,a t+1) > ρ. On the other hand if Wt+1 ≥ W∗
t+1, we infer
from (3.5) and (3.6) that Rt = ρ,K t = K∗
t , and St = ρ−1[Wt+1 − Φ(Kt)].
18When B =0 , δ =1and ρ =0 , there is no production and no technology to transfer real
resources intertemporally: Ct = Wt = e and Kt = St =0for all t. The model then reduces to
SPEC, the exchange economy of Calvet (1997).
15Step 2.E q u a t i o n s(3.7) − (3.9) then assign unique values to at,C t and Wt.
We observe that (at,K t,S t,R t) ∈ (0,1) × R∗
+ × R+ × [ρ,+∞), while no simple
restrictions seem to be imposed on current consumption and wealth. ¥
The equilibrium dynamics is thus fully characterized by the three-dimensional
vector zt.19 The proposition deﬁnes the recursive mappings xt = e H(zt+1) and
zt = H(zt+1). (3.10)
We also note that the condition Wt+1 ∈ [e,+∞) does not guarantee that Wt ∈
[e,+∞).
The equilibrium calculation is very similar to the method used for the tradi-
tional Ramsey model. At the terminal date, individuals consume all their wealth,
and the state variables satisfy the relations aT =1and CT = WT. For any choice
of WT ∈ [e,+∞),w es e tzT =( 1 ,W T,W T) and recursively calculate the im-
plied path zt−1 = H(zt). Some terminal wealth levels WT imply that Wt <e
and the algorithm stops at an instant t>0. Other values WT generate an entire
path {zt}T
t=0 a n da ni n i t i a lw e a l t hl e v e lW0. The recursion thus deﬁnes a function
W0(WT), whose domain is a subset of [e,+∞). Since the initial wealth W 0 ∈ R is
exogenously ﬁxed, an equilibrium corresponds to a terminal wealth level WT such
that W0(WT)=W 0. W ec a nt h e ne a s i l yp r o v e
Theorem 3. There exists a GEI equilibrium in any economy.
The equilibrium calculation is thus very straightforward. We guess a ﬁnal wealth
WT, calculate a path, and check that the implied W0(WT) is equal to the exogenous
wealth W0 of the economy.
The diﬀerence between the complete and incomplete market case stems from
the nonmonotonicities embedded in the equilibrium recursion. For instance, when
future wealth Wt+1 is low (Wt+1 <W ∗
t+1),a ni n c r e a s ei nWt+1 implies a higher
capital stock Kt = Φ−1(Wt+1) and a lower interest rate Rt,w h i c hl e a d st oa n
increase in the component −ln(βRt)/A of current consumption. Under complete
markets, these are the only eﬀects and current consumption Ct and wealth Wt
are increasing functions of future wealth Wt+1. When markets are incomplete,
19We note that the dimensionality of our system is inﬂuenced by the ﬁnancial structure and
the aggregate productivity of capital. More speciﬁcally, our three-dimensional model reduces to:
a two-dimensional system in (Ct,W t) when B>0 and markets are complete (σP = σE =0 ) ;a
one-dimensional system in at when agents do not produce (B =0 , δ =1 , ρ =0 ) .
16however, the higher capital investment Kt implies that individual producers are
bearing more production risk and have a stronger precautionary motive. As a
result, current consumption Ct and wealth Wt can be decreasing functions of
future wealth Wt+1.
Numerical simulations conﬁrm that such non-monotonicities do occur along
equilibrium paths. For instance, Figure 2 illustrates the function W0(WT) for
appropriate values of the economy’s parameters. We observe that W0(WT) is
non-monotonic, and infer
Proposition 3. There robustly exist multiple equilibria in some economies.
By contrast, it is straightforward to check that the function W0(WT) is increasing
and that there exists a unique equilibrium path when markets are complete (σP =
σE =0 ) .
For simplicity, we now focus on economies with a single equilibrium, and cal-
culate the unique growth path using the equilibrium recursion. Figure 1 displays
an economy with large endogenous ﬂuctuations, even though there is no aggregate
uncertainty. This graph, as well as Figure 2, illustrate the kind of complex dy-
namics that the introduction of incomplete markets may generate in an otherwise
standard neoclassical economy. Such behaviors do not necessarily require a high
degree of impatience. In Figure 1, we obtain endogenous ﬂuctuations along the
unique equilibrium path for a high psychological discount factor (β =0 .99) and
a low rate of capital depreciation (δ =0 .1). Note that endogenous cycles and
non-monotonicities require substantial undiversiﬁable idiosyncratic risks in these
two examples.
These results suggest that market incompleteness can help obtain endogenous
ﬂuctuations for reasonable parameter values in earlier models considered in the
literature. For instance, large investor impatience is required to obtain cycles in
one-sector growth models with non-convex technologies (Boldrin and Montruc-
chio, 1986; Deneckere and Pelikan, 1986; Sorger, 1992; Mitra, 1996). The results
of Figure 1 and Section 4 indicate that ﬁnancial incompleteness is a useful substi-
tute for investor impatience in the calibration of these stationary economies. Sim-
ilarly, incomplete markets could help generate ﬂuctuations in endogenous growth
models (Benhabib and Farmer, 1994) for reasonable levels of investor impatience,
uninsurable risks and increasing returns.
Figures 3 and 4 consider the case of small market incompleteness. We choose
an economy with T =1 ,000 periods and parameters A =1 0 , B =1 , β =0 .95,
17α =0 .40, δ =0 .05, ρ =1 −δ,e=0 , σE =0 , and σP =0 .50.20 Because uninsurable
risks are now relatively small, we may expect that the GEI equilibrium remains
relatively close to the complete-market growth path. In fact, the GEI growth
path combines two features: a turnpike property and a strong precautionary eﬀect
around the terminal date. Starting from a low level of initial wealth, the economy
accumulates wealth and remains many periods in the neighborhood of the GEI
steady state.21 This is evident in Figure 3, which plots log(Wt/W∞), the natural
logarithm of the ratio between equilibrium wealth Wt and the steady-state level
W∞. In the traditional Ramsey model, aggregate wealth progressively decreases
around the terminal date. Under incomplete markets, however, the last shocks
cannot be easily smoothed by borrowing and lending, and individuals have a
very strong precautionary motive before the terminal date. As a result, aggregate
wealth overshoots the steady state before being consumed in the very last periods.
4. Equilibrium under Inﬁnite Horizon
We now extend the model to an inﬁnite horizon. We successively discuss decision
theory, perfect foresight equilibria, and the properties of the steady state.
4.1. Decision Theory
Given a deterministic sequence of asset prices {πt}
+∞
t=0, we calculate the optimal
decision of an individual investor by taking the pointwise limit of the ﬁnite horizon
problem. In every period, let πL(t)=
P+∞
s=t+1 1/(Rt..Rs−1) denote the price of a
perpetuity, at =[ 1+πL(t)]−1 the marginal propensity to consume, and Kt the
smallest solution to equation (3.5). We also consider Mh





















We guarantee the convergence of the series by:







This assumption is suﬃcient (but not necessary) for the existence of at and bh
t.
20The full calibration of the model is discussed in Section 5.
21We discuss the steady state of the inﬁnite-horizon economy in the next sections.
18Theorem 5. Under Assumptions [1]−[3], the indirect utility of wealth is CARA
every period:
J(W,t)=−(Aat)
−1 exp[−A(atW + b
h
t)],
and consumption-portfolio decision rules satisfy (3.2).
Since the optimal decision is the limit of the ﬁnite horizon problem, Ponzi schemes
are ruled out in the strongest conceivable way, along any possible path.
4.2. Perfect Foresight Equilibria
We now introduce
Deﬁnition 2. A perfect foresight equilibrium (PFE) is a GEI equilibrium in
which prices are deterministic and satisfy Assumption [3].
It is straightforward to show
Proposition 4. I naP F E ,t h er i s kp r e m i u mi sz e r oa n dt h es e q u e n c e{zt}∞
t=0
satisﬁes the recursion zt = H(zt+1) in every period.
By Assumption [3], the sequence at =1 /[1 + πL(t)] is bounded away from 0 in a
PFE. Conversely, consider a sequence {zt =( at,C t,W t)}∞
t=0 satisfying equilibrium
recursion (3.10) and the condition inft at > 0. The perpetuity price πL(t)=1 /at−
1, the corresponding interest rate Rt and the price sequence πt =( 1 /Rt,0,..0) are
bounded across t. We infer from Theorem 5 that each agent has a unique optimal
plan and that markets are clearing in every date-event. The set of PFEs thus
identiﬁes with the set of sequences satisfying the equilibrium recursion (3.10)a n d
the condition inft at > 0.
4.3. Steady State
A steady state is a PFE in which the state vector zt is invariant through time:
zt = z∞ for all t. The vector z∞ is then a ﬁxed point of the recursion mapping H.
Assumption [3] implies that R∞ > 1,a ∞ =1−R−1
∞ , and the storage technology is
n o tu s e di nt h es t e a d ys t a t e(S∞ =0 ) . The steady interest rate and capital stock









The ﬁrst equation corresponds to the stationarity of consumption, and the second
to the optimality of the capital investment K∞. This system allows us to analyze
existence, multiplicity and comparative statics. We ﬁrst show
Theorem 6. There exists a steady state in every economy.
We note that R∞ ≤ 1/β, and that the upper bound 1/β is reached when markets
are complete. This result is a possible solution to the low risk-free rate puzzle,
which has been extensively discussed in the literature (e.g. Weil, 1992; Aiyagari,
1994; Constantinides and Duﬃe, 1996; Heaton and Lucas, 1996).
Multiple steady states can also arise under incomplete markets. As shown in
the Appendix, system (4.1) implicitly deﬁnes two decreasing functions K1(R) and
K2(R), which cross several times in some cases.22
Theorem 7. There robustly exists a multiplicity of steady states in some economies.
A steady state with a high interest rate also has low capital and aggregate wealth,
and can be interpreted as a poverty trap. In earlier work (e.g. Banerjee and New-
man, 1991), poverty traps originate in a wealth eﬀect: poor agents are unwilling
to take risk and make large investments in the productive technology. In our
model, investment is independent of individual wealth and the poverty trap arises
from the capital markets. When the endogenous interest rate is high, investors
are unwilling to invest large amounts in the high-yield risky technology and the
economy is stuck at a low wealth.
The comparative statics can easily be derived from system (4.1). In the follow-
ing theorem, we consider for simplicity an economy with a unique steady state.23
Theorem 8. In the neighborhood of a unique steady state, the capital stock K∞
locally increases with the endowment risk σE, the discount factor β, and the
productivity parameters B and 1 − δ. On the other hand, the production risk
22It is easy to show that the number of steady states is generically odd.
23See the Appendix for a discussion of multiple steady states.
20σP and the coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion A have ambiguous eﬀects on the
steady level of capital.
The recent literature on the neoclassical model with incomplete markets (Aiyagari,
1994; Krusell and Smith, 1998) has considered idiosyncratic risk in exogenous
income (σE > 0), but not in productive investment (σP =0 ) .T h et h e o r e ms h o w s
that the distinction between the two types of risks has important consequences for
the equilibrium steady state. We ﬁrst note that both forms of idiosyncratic risk
increase the precautionary demand for savings, which tends to reduce the interest
rate and increase capital investment. This explains why K∞ increases with σE,
as in Aiyagari (1994). We note, however, that uninsurable technological shocks
also reduce the risk-adjusted return to investment and can thus discourage capital
accumulation. These conﬂicting eﬀects lead to a non-monotonic relation between
σP and K∞ in some economies. These results help us understand the possible long
run eﬀects of ﬁnancial innovation on the macroeconomy.24 While better insurance
against endowment risk always reduces output through the precautionary eﬀect,
aggregate activity may actually be increased by new hedging instruments for
technological risks.
We could now present numerical simulations illustrating how the capital stock
and the interest rate vary with σP. However, the interpretation of these results
would be problematic because the elasticity of intertemporal substitution varies
inversely with consumption under CARA preferences.25 We thus postpone the nu-
merical calculations to Section 5, where we modify the model to match a constant
elasticity of substitution at the steady state.
4.4. Local Dynamics
The local dynamics around the steady state can be examined by linearizing the
recursion mapping H deﬁned by (3.5) − (3.9). We observe that wealth Wt is
the only predetermined variable in the model, while consumption and marginal
propensity are free to adjust. When markets are complete, the stable manifold
24In Angeletos and Calvet (2000), we ﬁnd a similar non-monotonicity between long-run growth
and market incompleteness in an endogenous-growth context.




t , the coeﬃcient of




t = ACt = −u00(Ct)Ct/u0(Ct).
The coeﬃcient γ∞ = AC∞ at the steady state therefore varies with σP, and it is diﬃcult to
disentangle the eﬀect of σP from changes in the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Section
5 presents a small modiﬁcation of the model that solves this diﬃculty.
21has dimension 1 and the system is locally determined. These results need not
hold under incomplete markets. Denoting by #ST the number of steady states,
we easily show
Theorem 9. When #ST =1 , the steady state is either locally determined or
locally undetermined depending on the parameters of the economy.
This establishes that our economy generates robust indeterminacy even when
agents are very patient (e.g. β =0 .95). We also note that it is not easy to rule
out this form of indeterminacy, because there is no obvious focal equilibrium on
which agents can coordinate. Consistent with the results of Section 3, this suggests
that market incompleteness could help generate indeterminacy and endogenous
ﬂuctuations for reasonable parameter values in calibrated models with increasing
returns to scale (Benhabib and Farmer, 1994).
We now examine Ramsey economies with multiple steady states. For the case
#ST =3 , the Appendix provides an economy in which the equilibria with the
lowest and highest interest rate exhibit local uniqueness, while the middle steady
state is totally unstable.
Theorem 10. When #ST > 1, some steady states can be totally unstable.
We can also ﬁnd examples of ﬂip bifurcations. This implies the existence of
cycles of period 2 on an open set of economies.
Theorem 11. Some economies robustly contain attracting cycles.
Note that these cycles can arise in economies with reasonably patient investors
(β =0 .95). Financial incompleteness thus allows us to eliminate the high dis-
counting required to obtain cycles in stationary economies with nonconvexities in
production (Boldrin and Montrucchio, 1986; Deneckere and Pelikan, 1986; Sorger,
1992). All these results illustrate the kind of complicated equilibrium dynamics
that ﬁnancial incompleteness generates in the neoclassical Ramsey framework
under inﬁnite horizon. In the next section we focus on reasonably calibrated
economies with a unique steady state and examine the eﬀe c to fm a r k e ti n c o m -
pleteness on the transitional dynamics.
225. Calibrated Steady State and Persistence
We now present calibrated results for the equilibrium growth path. A slightly
modiﬁed utility function is ﬁrst introduced to facilitate the comparison between
our model and the CRRA speciﬁcation. We then analyze the comparative statics
of the steady state and present simulations on the speed of convergence.
5.1. Extension: Calibrating CARA to CRRA
One diﬃculty with the standard CARA utility is that the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution becomes very large at very low consumption levels.26 To remedy
this problem, we denote by C∞ > 0 the mean consumption in the steady state














The coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion is now equal to γ at the steady state C∞,
which allows us to calibrate the model.
This utility has two possible interpretations. We can either view it as a behav-
ioral assumption that risk aversion is determined by the relative level of current
consumption to the steady state. Preferences are then endogenous to the econ-
omy. Alternatively, we interpret the hypothesis as a practical restriction on the
parameter space of the model introduced in the previous sections. In both cases,
the new speciﬁcation allows us to produce calibrated results that are directly
comparable with standard RBC models.
The equilibrium dynamics is given by Theorem 2 with the coeﬃcient A =
γ/C∞. The main diﬀerence with the previous approach lies in the calculation of
the steady state. We know that R∞ > 1,a ∞ =1− R−1
∞ , S∞ =0and W∞ =
Φ(K∞)=C∞+K∞, which implies that A = γ/[Φ(K∞)−K∞]. The steady interest



















Assuming for simplicity that e =0 , we show in the Appendix:
26Alternatively, the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion increases with the level of consumption.
23Theorem 12. For any σP ≥ 0 and σE > 0, there exists a steady state with
K∞ > 0 and 1 <R ∞ < 1/β.
Similar to Theorem 8, system (5.1) implies that the capital stock K∞ tends to
increase with the endowment risk σE, the discount factor β, and the productivity
parameters B and 1 − δ. On the other hand, the production risk σP and the
coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion γ have ambiguous eﬀects.
5.2. Comparative Statics with a Cobb-Douglas Technology
In order to calibrate the economy, we now assume that the technology is Cobb-
Douglas: F(K)=Kα. We set e =0 , and normalize the endowment risk to
be proportional to the steady-state output: [Va r(εh
t)]1/2 = σEF(K∞). Under
these hypotheses, the TFP is only a scale factor of the capital stock that can
be normalized to B =1 . We now interpret σP and σE as percentage rates. For
instance when σP =0 .25, the standard deviation of gross output, σPF(K∞),
represents 25% of the mean production F(K∞).
Let Q ≡ F(K)/K = Kα−1 denote the ratio of output to capital. Since

















Under complete markets (σP = σE =0 ) , the system implies R∞ =1 /β and
Q∞ =( 1− β + δβ)/(αβ) like in the standard Ramsey model. Consistent with
Section 4, the interest rate is smaller (R∞ < 1/β) when idiosyncratic risks are
partially undiversiﬁable.
We loosely interpret Γ∞ as an ‘eﬀective’ degree of prudence and risk aversion,
which measures the eﬀect of σP or σE on savings and investment. When σ2
P and σ2
E
are close to 0, the ﬁrst-order variations in R∞ and Q∞ are obtained by keeping Γ∞
constant in (5.2). It is then straightforward to work out the comparative statics
24of the steady state.27
More generally, we can analyze the monotonicities around any ﬁnancial struc-
ture by slightly adapting the arguments of Section 4.28 An increase in the endow-
ment risk σE aﬀects the precautionary savings motive but not the risk-adjusted
return to capital investment. As a result, the general-equilibrium eﬀect of an
increase in σE is to reduce both R∞ and Q∞ and thereby increase K∞. This is
precisely what Aiyagari (1994) showed.
The eﬀect of the productivity risk σP is fundamentally diﬀerent for two rea-
sons. First, an increase in σP reduces the risk-adjusted return to capital and has
therefore a direct adverse eﬀect on investment demand. Second, even when σP in-
creases, agents can potentially bear less risk by simply reducing their investment
in the risky technology. In equilibrium, the precautionary eﬀect of an increase in
σP may thus be moderated by a decrease in capital investment.
When σP increases, the investment and precautionary motives have opposite
eﬀects on the capital stock K∞. The dominant force depends on both preferences
(prudence and risk aversion, γ) and technology (strength of diminishing returns,
α, and magnitude of risk, σP and σE). Numerical simulations suggest the following
pattern as we vary σP. For a low to moderate risk aversion γ,t h ei n v e s t m e n te ﬀect
always dominates; in this case, completing the markets unambiguously increases
capital accumulation. On the other hand, the capital stock is a single-peaked
function of σP when the risk aversion γ is suﬃciently high.
Figures 5 and 6 illustrate the monotonicities of the capital stock K∞ and
the net interest rate r∞ ≡ R∞ − 1 for typical parameters of RBC models in
annual frequency: α =0 .4, δ =0 .05, and β =0 .95. In each graph, the solid line
corresponds to σE =0and the dashed one to σE = 25%.W h e n γ =2 , capital
monotonically decreases as σP varies from 0 to 100% (Figure 5). On the other
hand for a higher risk aversion (γ =1 0 ) , the relation between σP and capital
is non-monotonic (Figure 6). We also observe that investment risk has a small
eﬀect on capital for the chosen parameters. At σP = 100%, the capital stock
K∞ is about 10% lower than its complete-market value when γ =2 .M a r k e t
incompleteness has a small eﬀect because idiosyncratic shocks are very short and
transitory. Investors can eﬃciently self-insure by borrowing and lending, and the
27When σ2




P), where γcrit =2 α(Q∞−δ)/(R∞ −1). The
capital stock thus decreases as we move away from complete markets if and only if γ < γcrit.
28See the proof of Theorem 12 in the Appendix.
25lack of insurance has no substantial impact on the macroeconomic aggregates.
Financial incompleteness does matter, however, if idiosyncratic shocks are
more persistent or investment is subject to adjustment costs. Persistence in id-
iosyncratic shocks and high setup costs seem to be empirically valid assumptions,
especially if we think of human capital development, large R&D projects, or other
investments that involve specialization, indivisibilities, and long horizons. To cap-
ture these eﬀects, we simply increase the length of a time period, and view the
interval between t and t +1as the horizon of an investment project. Consider
for instance an investment horizon of 5 years, which approximately corresponds
to the length of a large investment project, or the length of a college or graduate
degree.29 As previously, we assume that the capital share is α =0 .4,a n dt h a t
the discount rate and the depreciation rate are both approximately 5% per year
(β =0 .75 and δ =0 .25 over a 5-year period). With an intermediate risk aversion
(γ =6 ) , Figure 7 illustrates that uninsurable risks have a substantial eﬀect on
the steady state.30 At σP = 100%, the capital stock K∞ is now about half what it
would be under full insurance. Figure 8 reports similar results using a higher cap-
ital share (α =0 .7) intended to capture investment in both physical and human
capital (and other intangibles). The eﬀect of uninsured risk is again very strong.
These examples suggest that insurance problems can have substantial eﬀects on
capital accumulation when markets are incomplete, as is the case in most of the
developing world.
The simulations also provide valuable insights on the interaction between ad-
ditive and multiplicative risks. Recall that in Figures 5 − 8, the dashed lines
correspond to σE =2 5 %and the solid ones to σE =0 . We observe that the
s t e a d ys t a t ei sl e s ss e n s i t i v et oσE as the productivity risk σP increases (see espe-
cially Figures 7 and 8). This is because when σP is large, individuals are already
holding a buﬀer stock that can be used to insure against both investment and
endowment risks. The precautionary eﬀect of σP similarly diminishes with σE,
implying that the investment eﬀect dominates more easily when there is already
a lot of precautionary saving in the economy.
29When an investment project is sensitive to political risk, a period of four or ﬁve years also
corresponds to the time interval between elections.
30We interpret the length of a time period to be one year in Figures 5 and 6, and ﬁve years
in Figures 7 and 8. For simplicity, however, the graphs report the steady state quantities K∞
and r∞ corresponding to a time period of the model, and not their annualized equivalents.
265.3. Convergence and Persistence
We now show that convergence to the steady state can be slower under incom-
plete markets than with a complete ﬁnancial structure. We demonstrate this
eﬀect by examining the rate of convergence to the steady state. As discussed in
the Appendix, we calculate the stable eigenvalue λ of the linearized system and
approximate the local dynamics by log(Kt+1/K∞)=λ log(Kt/K∞). The quan-
tity 1 − λ is then called the convergence rate. Market incompleteness slows down
convergence to the steady state if 1−λ decreases with σP. Numerical simulations
show that such is the case, at least near σP =0 , for a wide range of plausible
parameter values. We also observe that the speed of convergence is sometimes
non-monotonic for large values of σP.
For the typical RBC parameters used in Figure 5 (α =0 .4, δ =0 .05, β =0 .95,
σE =0and γ =2 ) , the convergence rate decreases monotonically as σP varies
from 0 to 100%. The magnitude of the decline, however, is very modest. The
convergence rate equals 5.4% under complete markets, and 5.2% when σP =1 0 0 % .
As in Figure 5, the insurance problem is negligible with this calibration. Shocks
are short, transitory, and easy to spread through intertemporal smoothing.
The convergence rate falls substantially, however, if idiosyncratic risks are large
and persistent. Consider for instance a 5-year investment project involving both
physical and human capital. As in Figure 8, we calibrate the model with α =0 .7,
β =0 .75 (discount rate ≈ 5% per year), δ =0 .25 (≈ 5% per year), σE =0 ,
and γ =6 .F i g u r e9 illustrates how investment risk inﬂuences the local dynamics
around the steady state. When σP increases from 0 to 25%, the convergence rate
falls from 3.4% to 2.4%, and the corresponding half-life of a shock31 increases
from 20 to 30 periods. This is a very substantial increase, which suggests that
undiversiﬁable productivity shocks can play a useful role for the calibration of
RBC models (Kydland and Prescott, 1982; Prescott, 1986; Cooley, 1995). We
expect that ﬁnancial incompleteness should signiﬁcantly reduce the persistence
of the exogenous aggregate shocks used in these models to match aggregate time
series.
The intuition underlying these results is quite straightforward. In the complete
market Ramsey framework, a negative wealth shock has some persistence because
agents seek to smooth consumption across time. Under incomplete markets, con-
vergence is also slowed down by the eﬀect of the precautionary motive on interest
31The half-line T is deﬁned by the equation λ
T =1 /2, or equivalently T = −log2 λ.
27rates. Consider for instance an economy starting at a low wealth level. Because
agents make small risky investments, they have a weaker precautionary demand
for savings than in the long run. This puts a downward pressure on the interest
rate, which accentuates the low level of capital investment and slows down con-
vergence. Conversely in a rich economy, high investment in the risky technology
implies a strong precautionary motive and a low interest rate, which intensiﬁes
the high level of capital. In both cases, prudence increases the persistence of an
aggregate shock, and has an ampliﬁcation eﬀect on investment and interest rates.
We observe that these results crucially depends on the riskiness of production
and thus could not be observed in the models of Aiyagari (1994) and Krusell and
Smith (1998). An empirical investigation of a cross-section of countries would be
a natural test of our results.
6. Conclusion
This paper introduces an incomplete market economy with decentralized produc-
tion and idiosyncratic technological risk. We assume that there are no short sales
constraints, and that the absence of certain assets is the only source of market
imperfection in the economy. To simplify the analysis, we do not consider the pos-
sibility of aggregate uncertainty. Macroeconomic aggregates and ﬁnancial prices
are then deterministic but can possibly follow complicated dynamics and cycles.
Because it inﬂuences risk-taking, market incompleteness plays a critical role on
the level and volatility of aggregate activity, even though the wealth distribution
plays no role in the equilibrium dynamics of our model. The interaction between
the precautionary motive and investment risk is thus a powerful source of poverty
traps and volatility in incomplete-market economies.
The paper also contains interesting comparative statics properties. First, there
can exist multiple steady states because agents may prefer to remain poor rather
than bear the large investment risks that are required to increase their standards
of living. The poverty trap hinges on the endogeneity of the interest rate rather
than the typical wealth eﬀect. In addition, the introduction of a new asset (or a
new insurance contract) has an ambiguous eﬀect on the level of aggregate wealth
in the steady state. On one hand, the new security may reduce technological
risk and thus encourage investment. On the other hand, ﬁnancial innovation
dampens the precautionary demand for savings, increases the interest rate, and
thus discourages productive investment. Overall, the level of aggregate wealth is
28found to be the highest in economies with intermediate or high levels of ﬁnancial
sophistication. We note that the positive eﬀect of ﬁnancial innovation would be
stronger if agents had utility functions, such as CRRA, in which the reduction
in the endowment risk could also encourage agents to invest more in the risky
technology.32
This work suggests several directions for further research. Work in progress
attempts to introduce aggregate uncertainty in our model. This will allow us to
embed our results in a stochastic RBC framework and characterize the impulse
response of the economy to aggregate shocks. Another paper, Angeletos and Cal-
vet (2000), considers market incompleteness in an endogenous growth context.
There is then an interaction between the ﬁnancial structure, the investment spe-
cialization patterns, and the long-run growth rate of the economy. These various
projects may help us further understand the interaction between ﬁnancial markets
and the real sector of the economy.
32Kimball (1993) shows that a background risk negatively aﬀects investement in an indepen-
dent risky project when agents have decreasing absolute risk aversion and decreasing absolute
prudence.
297. Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1
An entrepreneur chooses consumption ch
t, capital expenditure kh
t , storage sh
t



























t , and the non-negativity
constraints: kh
t ≥ 0,s h


































t is the Lagrange multiplier associated to the non-negativity of capital.
Since di,t+1 and wh
























































t ) − Rtπi,t/(Aat+1).





















































































If B + Rt
PN
i=1 πi,tκh
i > 0, we infer that kh
t > 0 and λ
h
t =0 . We then divide this
equation by (7.1) and obtain optimality condition (3.1).
We ﬁnally turn to the FOC associated to the riskless asset. Since










equation (7.1) simpliﬁes to
0=Ac
h





















































































































31B yt h ee n v e l o p et h e o r e mJw(w,t)=e x p ( −Ach
t), the Recursive Condition is sat-
isﬁed at date t.
Proof of Proposition 1
Under condition (iii), the function G(k,a) is concave in k and equation (3.4)
has a unique solution. More generally, consider an arbitrary production func-
tion and let k0 = F −1[B/(Aat+1σ2
P)]. The function Gk(k,at+1)=F 0(k)[B −
Aat+1F(k)σ2
P]+1− δ is decreasing and larger than 1 −δ when k ∈ (0,k 0], and is
strictly smaller than 1−δ on [k0,+∞). The equation Gk(k,at+1)=Rt has thus a
unique solution when Rt ≥ 1 − δ, as is always the case under condition (i).
We now consider a Cobb-Douglas technology F(k)=kα and an arbitrary













PF(k) − (1 − α)B
¤
.
When α > 1/2, the function Gk is strictly decreasing in the capital stock, and
satisﬁes limk→0 Gk(k,at+1)=+ ∞, limk→+∞ Gk(k,at+1)=−∞; the equation
Gk(k,at+1)=Rt has thus a unique solution for all Rt > 0. On the other hand when
α < 1/2, the function Gk(k,at+1) is decreasing for low values of k, reaches a mini-
mum Rmin(at+1), and converges to 1−δ as k → +∞. Equation (3.4) has therefore
two solutions when Rmin(at+1) <R t < 1 − δ, and no solution if Rt <R min(at+1).





<G (k1,a t+1)+( k2 − k1)Rt.
Any admissible plan of the form (c,k2,s,θ) is therefore suboptimal.
Proof of Theorem 2
We show the theorem by a backward recursion. At date t = T, agents have
identical propensities aT =1and make no risky investment: kh
T =0 . Assume now
that the properties of the theorem hold at instants t +1 ,..,T.
Step 1.W e ﬁrst want to show that there is no risk premium in equilibrium:
πi,t =0for all i. It is convenient to deﬁne the truncated price vector b πt =( πi,t)N
i=1
and the individual vectors κh =( κh
i )N
i=1. Since there is no aggregate multiplicative
32shock, we know that
PH
h=1 κh =0and therefore
PH
h=1 b πt · κh =0 . Without loss
of generality, we index households so that
b πt · κ
1 ≥ ... ≥ b πt · κ
L ≥ 0 ≥ b πt · κ
L+1 ≥ ... ≥ b πt · κ
H.
The corresponding capital stocks provided by equation (3.1) then satisfy k1
t ≥
... ≥ kH
























i /(HRt). This yields the vector equal-














































b πt · κ
h ≤ 0.
We conclude that b πt =0in any equilibrium.
Step 2. In equilibrium agents make the same investment kh
t = Kt > 0 in the





i F(Kt) units of each risky
asset; she thus sells at no cost the tradable components of her production and
endowment risks. Equations (3.5) and (3.7) are implied by individual decision,
and equations (3.6) and (3.9) are obtained by aggregating the budget constraints.
























Aggregation of this relation then yields equation (3.8).W eﬁnally note that the
macro aggregates are the same in all states of date t.
33Proof of Theorem 3
Consider a ∈ R and the mapping
ϕ(WT)=
½
W0(WT) if W0(WT) is deﬁned and larger than a,
a otherwise.
Since ϕ is continuous on its domain [e,+∞), its image is an interval of the real line.
When WT → e, productive investment KT−1 and sT−1 decline to zero, implying
that RT−1 → +∞,a T−1 → 1,c T−1 →− ∞ ,W T−1 →− ∞ , and ϕ(e)=a. On the
other hand when WT → +∞, we observe that Rt = ρ for all t and ϕ(WT) → +∞.
This establishes that ϕ[e,+∞)=[ a,+∞). Since the argument applies to any
choice of a,w ec o n c l u d et h a tϕ(WT)=W0 has a solution for any W0 ∈ R.
Proof of Theorem 5
In order to check that bh
















i F(Kt)+Rtπi,t/(2Aat+1)]. By Assumption [3], the sequences {at}∞
t=0 and {Rt}∞
t=0
are contained in compact intervals of the form [a,1] and [ρ,R], where a > 0.T h i s
implies that the inﬁnite sequences {Kt} and {Xh
t }∞
t=0 are bounded. We also infer







t=0 is thus well-deﬁned and bounded.














such that W 0



































T=0 is bounded and exp(−AaTW 0
T) ≤ 1+exp(−AW 0
T),A s -




















This proves that J(W,Z) is an upper bound to the value function. It is then easy
to check that the consumption plan deﬁned by (3.2) is admissible and reaches
J(W,Z).
Proof of Theorems 6 and 8
Letting ϕ(R) ≡ A−2 (1 − 1/R)
−2 ln( 1
























+1− δ − R =0 . (7.10)
The function ϕ(R) decreases on (1,1/β] and satisﬁes ϕ(1,1/β]=[ 0 ,+∞). Equa-










E/2)] onto [0,+∞). Similarly, equation (7.10) implicitly
deﬁnes the decreasing function K2(R) that maps [1,+∞) onto (0,K∗], where
K∗ =( F 0)−1(δ/B).
Consider the function ∆(R)=K1(R)−K2(R). When R → 1, we observe that
K1(R) → +∞,K 2(R) → K∗, and therefore ∆(R) → +∞. We also note that
∆[ϕ−1(σ2
E/2)] = −K2[ϕ−1(σ2
E/2)] < 0. The graphs of the functions K1 and K2
therefore intersect and there exists at least one steady state.
Finally, we analyze the monotonicity of the steady state with respect to the
economy’s parameters. We consider the case |K0
2(R)| < |K0
1(R)|.A n i n c r e a s e
in σE or β pushes down the function K1(R) and leaves the function K2(R) un-
changed. The steady state is therefore characterized by a lower interest rate and
a higher capital stock. Similarly, an increase in 1 − δ and B pushes up K2(R),
also leading to a lower interest rate and a higher capital stock. We note that an
35increase in A or σP pushes down both K1(R) and K2(R) and can have ambiguous
eﬀe c t s ,a si sv e r i ﬁed in simulations.
Proof of Theorem 7
It is enough to provide an example of multiplicity. We numerically check that
there exist three equilibria when A =1 .2,B=2 0 , α =0 .95, β =0 .05, δ =0 .5,
ρ =1− δ, σ2
P =8 5 , σE =0 ,e=0 .
Proof of Theorem 9, 10 and 11: Local Stability of the Steady State
Around the steady state, we know that there is no storage, and the iterated
function H is implicitly deﬁned by:
Kt = Φ−1(Wt+1),
Rt = F0(Kt)[B − Aat+1F(Kt)σ2
P]+1− δ,
at =1 /[1 + (at+1Rt)−1],




Wt = Ct + Kt.













































Let ϕ(v)=1 /(1 + v−1). We note that ϕ(v)=v/(1 + v) and therefore ϕ0(v)=







































33Since R∞ > 1, we infer that B−Aat+1F(Kt)σ2
P > 0 on a neighborhood of the steady state.
36Future propensity at+1 has an ambiguous eﬀect on current propensity at. There
is both a positive direct eﬀect (due to the complementarity of future and current
consumption) and a negative indirect eﬀect (the precautionary motive causes












































An increase in at+1 and Wt+1 leads to a decline in the current interest rate, which
has a positive eﬀect on current consumption. On the other hand, the increase in
at+1 and Wt+1 implies that the agent bears more risk between time t and time t+1.
The precautionary motive can then lead to a decrease in current consumption and
current wealth, which may generate endogenous ﬂuctuations.
























The roots of P are the eigenvalues of the backward dynamical system.34 Since
P(−∞)=+ ∞ and P(+∞)=−∞, there always exists a real eigenvalue. Simple
calculation shows that P(1) > 0 if and only if |K0
2(R∞)| < |K0
1(R∞)|. Thus when
there is a unique steady state, the Jacobian matrix J has an eigenvalue in (1,+∞),
and the dimension of the stable manifold is at least 1.






















This implies that x = β is an eigenvalue, which is contained in the interval (0,1).
We observe that Q(0) > 0 and Q(1) < 0, and infer the polynomial Q has one root
34The eigenvalue λ considered in Section 5 thus satisﬁes P(1/λ)=0 .
37in the interval (0,1) and one root in (1,+∞). Overall, the Jacobian matrix J has
two eigenvalues in the interval (0,1), and one eigenvalue larger than 1.T h es t a b l e
manifold has thus dimension 1.
Consider the parameter values: β =0 .95,A=2 ,B=1 0 , α =0 .35, δ =
ρ =0 .1, σE =0 . We check numerically that the characteristic polynomial has one
eigenvalue x1 > 1 and two eigenvalues in the unit circle when σP ≤ 30.5. On the
other hand when σP =3 1 .5, the steady state is unique and there is one eigenvalue
in each of the interval (−∞,−1), (−1,1) and (1,+∞). This establishes Theorem
9. We also note that the system undergoes a ﬂip bifurcation as σP varies between
30.5 and 31.5, which proves Theorem 11.
Finally, consider the economy A =1 .2,B=2 0 , α =0 .95, β =0 .05, δ =0 .5,
ρ =1− δ, σ2
P =8 5 , σE =0 ,e=0examined in the proof of Theorem 7. This
economy has three steady states, and it can be checked numerically that the steady
state with the intermediate interest rate is totally unstable, thus establishing
Theorem 10.
Proof of Theorem 12: Analysis of the Calibrated Model
The steady state is deﬁned by the system (5.1). Since R∞ > 1, the sec-
ond equation implies that BF0(K∞)+1− δ > 1, or equivalently K∞ <K ∗ =
(F 0)−1(δ/B). We ﬁnd it useful to consider the decreasing function ψ(R)=2 γ−2(1−
R−1)−2 ln[1/(Rβ)], which maps (1,β





[Φ(K) − K]2 .








P − [BF0(K) − δ]σ2
E
[Φ(K) − K]3 .
The function χ(K) is thus increasing on (0,K∗] when σE =0 . Simulations show
that χ(K) and R1(K) can be non-monotonic when σE > 0.
When K → 0, the function χ(K) converges to (σP/B)2 if σE =0 , and diverges
to +∞ if σE > 0. As a result, R1(K) converges to
½
ψ
−1[(σP/B)2] if σE =0 ,
1 if σE > 0.
38We also note that χ0(K∗) > 0 and thus R0
1(K∗) < 0.
As in the proof of Theorem 6, we note that for every K ∈ (0,K∗], there exists a
unique R2 ≥ 1 such that the second equation of (5.1) holds. This number, denoted
R2(K), is decreasing with K and satisﬁes R2(K∗)=1 . In order to analyze the
behavior of the function R2 as K → 0, we rewrite the second equation of the
system as: R2 − η(K)R − γσ2
PF0(K)ζ(K)=0 , where ζ(K) ≡ F(K)/[Φ(K) −
K] and η(K) ≡ Φ0(K) − γσ2
PF0(K)ζ(K). This quadratic equation in R has one














When K → 0, note that ζ(K) → B−1 and η(K) ∼ BF0(K)[1 − γ(σP/B)2]. We
thus distinguish several cases:
1. If γ(σP/B)2 ≤ 1, the function R2(K) diverges to +∞ as K → 0.












converges to the ﬁnite limit
γ(σP/B)2
γ(σP/B)2−1.
We now consider the diﬀerence ∆(K)=R2(K) − R1(K), and observe that
∆(K∗)=1 − R1(K∗) < 0. When γ(σP/B)2 ≤ 1, the function ∆(K) → +∞ as
K → 0; continuity then imposes the existence of a steady state. Similarly when
γ(σP/B)2 > 1 and σE > 0, the function ∆(K) →
γ(σP/B)2
γ(σP/B)2−1 − 1 > 0 as K → 0




−1[(σP/B)2] has an ambiguous sign; a steady state may not
exist, as is the case in some simulations.
Like in the proof of Theorem 8, we can now analyze the comparative statics
of a steady state. An increase in σ2
E or β leaves R2(K) unchanged and pushes
down R1(K).W h e n|R0
2(K∞)| > |R0
1(K∞)|, this leads to a higher capital stock
K∞ and a smaller interest rate R∞. Similarly, an increase in B and 1 − δ pushes
up R2(K) and has no eﬀect on R1(K), leading to a higher K∞ and a smaller R∞.
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Figure 2: A10, B10, 0.35, 0.9, 0.5, 0.5, e0, E0, P100, T40.
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Figure 5: 2, 0.95, 0.4, 0.05, and E0 solid or E0.25 dashed



































Figure 7: 6, 0.75, 0.4, 0.25, and E0 solid or E0.25 dashed





























periods Half Life of Shock
Figure 9: 6, 0.75, 0.7, 0.25, and E0.